

In Memoriam

Lt. Thimsthy L. Worth KIA Tet 1968
Engineer-Mobility
Section Leader
Combined Caterial Exploitation Center

SFC Brian Izzard Sp4 Larry Massie Major John Hosford and all other Technical Intelligence personnel who gave their lives while serving our nation.

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FORWARD

A commander's success in battle is dependent upon many factors, one of which is a knowledge of the enemy force and its capabilities and limitations which, when coupled with his knowledge of his own forces' capabilities and limitations, will allow him to select the best course of action.

The knowledge of the enemy force is accomplished during peacetime by study of all potential adversaries, their tactics and equipment. Through realistic training exercises, he will gain the knowledge of his own forces. During actual combat operations, he must depend upon his staff to accomplish much of his work for him while he supervises his subordinant commanders.

The intelligence officer from S 2 up to J 2 has the responsibility for keeping track of the enemy and estimating their capabilities and intentions. During peacetime, the intelligence officers must share in the responsibility for helping to insure the realism needed for the conduct of training.

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all information concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas which are immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of military plans, policies, operations and development of military equipment.

Technical Intelligence is that aspect of intelligence concerning foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign material. This is closely allied with Scientific and Technical Intelligence which includes that foreign intelligence relating to basic and applied research in natural and applied sciences and in applied engineering techniques.

The United States has an excellent system for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, but it was not always that way. Since 1918, the scientific and intelligence community and Technical Intelligence efforts have grown from a few people operating independently to a large sophisticated organization. This growth has been accelerated in wartime and slowed during peacetime. It has been modified for each conflict and has made considerable progress over the years.

The author traces this growth and ties each change in with the strategic and tactical situations that produced the changes. The author has had many years of experience in the military, having served as a Technical Intelligence officer on my staff in Vietnam and moving on to other assignments in the Active Army and as a Reserve Officer working with Combat and Combat Service Support units in the National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve and Active Component Units and his civilian occupation in civilian Research and Development

organizations. In addition, the author commanded the llth Military History Detachment during the evacuation from France.

The author's main premise is that, while we may have a highly sophisticated organization operating at the strategic level, we have not had the same success in expanding it down to the tactical level. Since history never reveals its alternatives, the author avoids discussing what might have happened in Vietnam if...but simply states what did happen and then moves on from there into the 1980's.

The author points out some of the shortcomings in our training programs and how we have been able to correct these deficiencies as time and material become available. The author provides some guidance on field expedient training aids that can be made and used to enhance the realism needed in training, as well as some guidance on more sophisticated equipment for classroom training.

During my years in Vietnam, our intelligence organization expanded to meet the needs but this expansion was slow and the Technical Intelligence effort was not a high priority. Based upon our concepts of Technical Intelligence at the time, a higher priority was not justified. Given the current concepts and doctrine, based largely upon the mid-east wars and the aftermath of Vietnam, I share the author's belief that consideration should be given to the development of more sophisticated Technical Intelligence efforts - both tactical and strategic.

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